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effective in promoting empowerment rights. 
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1. Introduction   
At the beginning of the 21
st century, governments’ disrespect for human rights is still 
evident in all regions of the world. Human rights violations continue to be the norm 
rather than the exception. According to Amnesty International (2006), millions of people 
worldwide are still denied fundamental rights. That being said, governments’ respect for 
human rights is higher in some countries than in others and over the last few decades 
improvements have been visible in many of these countries. At the same time, 
globalization and economic freedom has had dramatic consequences on policies and 
outcomes around the world.
1 In this paper, we argue that economic freedom and 
globalization are important determinants of governments’ respect for human rights. 
Competition between economies has become tougher and expanded to an unprecedented 
worldwide level. Global investors in financial markets exploit even marginal differences 
in the rates of return and thus generate pressure on local governments. This global 
development is sometimes viewed as being responsible for disenfranchisement, 
exploitation, and other forms of human rights abuses (e.g., Rabet 2009). On the other 
hand, improvements in human rights are sometimes attributed to the spread of liberal 
ideas, which is one of the key dimensions of globalization (e.g., Rosenau 2003). 
We extend the theoretical perspective on the determinants of human rights 
practice by Poe and Tate (1994) to include globalization and economic freedom. We then 
empirically investigate whether these aspects actually affect governments’ respect for 
human rights, as measured by the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI, 
Cingranelli and Richards 2006).
2 Our study thus connects to the empirical literature on 
the determinants of human rights that has emerged through the availability of data on 
human rights violations.  
The question of whether economic globalization affects human rights has been 
examined previously (Apodaca 2001; Evans 1999; Hafner-Burton 2005; Mitchell and 
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994).
3 However, in previous studies the influence of 
globalization has been measured by the extent of capital controls, openness to trade, and 
                                                 
1 See Dreher et al. (2008) for a comprehensive overview. 
2 The index divides human rights into 13 internationally recognized rights, aggregated to two sublevels—
basic human rights (so called physical integrity rights) and broader civil liberties (i.e., empowerment 
rights). This allows us to identify the specific effects of these two different categories on human rights. 
3 See also the discussion in Pollis (2004).   3
the amount of foreign direct investment. From a policy perspective, the influence of all 
these individual elements of economic globalization on human rights is definitely 
important. But most elements of economic globalization are highly correlated. Therefore, 
it is not advisable to include them all independently in one regression. Omitting 
dimensions on the other hand, causes biased coefficients. Due to a lack of data, the 
literature has focused on single aspects of economic globalization and human rights, 
instead of applying a comprehensive approach. Using aggregate indicators of 
globalization is preferable, because single negative effects could be neutralized by other 
positive effects, and it is the overall effect of economic globalization that is decisive for 
an evaluation of its merits. Hence, only an aggregate measure of economic globalization 
can be used to study the overall effect. We use the economic dimension of the KOF Index 
of Globalization (Dreher 2006a; Dreher et al. 2008), which aggregates the individual 
dimensions and allows us to provide the first comprehensive investigation of the effects 
of economic globalization on human rights violations.  
As the KOF Index of Globalization also separates the political and social 
dimensions of globalization from the economic dimension, we are able to take an even 
broader perspective and comprehensively analyze the impact of these three distinct 
dimensions of globalization on human rights.  
In addition to external integration and liberalization (globalization), internal 
economic liberalization has also been discussed as a potentially important determinant of 
human rights (e.g., Burkhart 2002; Huntington 1968; Marx 2002). Internal economic 
freedom comprises, for instance, voluntary exchange, free competition, and protection of 
persons and property within a national economy. Therefore, we also examine the impact 
of economic freedom on human rights. Again it can be argued that correlation between 
the variables of interest is important. Given the apparent correlation between economic 
freedom and the three dimensions of globalization (Bjørnskov 2006), not controlling for 
economic freedom when investigating the effect of globalization on human rights could 
bias the results, and vice versa. 
In summary, this paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of how 
economic freedom and the three dimensions of globalization affect governments’ respect 
for human rights. Our empirical analysis puts particular weight on gauging the robustness   4
of the empirical relationship between the variables of interest. Specifically, we employ 
(variants of) the extreme bounds analysis (EBA), as proposed by Leamer (1983) and 
Levine and Renelt (1992). We also investigate whether causality does indeed run from 
globalization and economic freedom to human rights rather than the other way around.  
We continue as follows. The next section motivates our control variables, 
building on the model of Poe and Tate (1994). Section 3 then expands the model and 
presents our main hypotheses. How we measure human rights, globalization, and 
economic freedom is outlined in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 describes the method of 
estimation and our covariates, while the results are shown in section 7. The final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The Determinants of Human Rights 
Our starting point for analyzing governments’ respect for human rights is the model of 
Poe and Tate (1994: 855-859), according to which a government’s decision to respect 
human rights is determined by ten variables in six areas:
 4  
(i)  the level of democracy;  
(ii)  the level of economic development and its growth rate;  
(iii)  population size and its growth rate; 
(iv)  the prevalence of a military and/or leftist regime;  
(v)  British cultural influence, and  
(vi)  (recent) experience with international and/or civil war. 
In Poe and Tate’s model, human rights repression is a tool for governments to solve 
conflicts. If a government is threatened, it reacts by repressing human rights, for instance, 
through imprisonment, torture or killings. Since in democracies, processes involve the 
bargaining of parties, conflicts can be solved in a more peaceful manner compared to 
autocracies (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). In democracies, repressive 
governments can be ousted from office in elections. Moreover, the characteristic 
freedoms in democracies allow citizens to publicize and decry abusive actions. Overall, 
democracy is expected to improve governments’ respect for human rights (see also 
                                                 
4 Poe and Tate focus on the subset of human rights labeled ”integrity of person.“ However, their theory can 
easily be generalized for all forms of human rights.   5
Davenport and Armstrong 2004). We control for democracy by using the Polity IV index 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2000).
5 
Regarding economic conditions, Poe and Tate argue that human rights abuses 
should decrease with economic development, yet increase with economic growth. The 
better the economic situation, measured by the quantity and quality of goods and services 
available, the less scarce are goods. Consequently, the potential for conflict, and thus 
repression, decreases (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991). The effect of 
economic growth is less obvious: Since economic growth is the engine of economic 
development, it should improve human rights practices in a country. However, growth 
usually involves winners and losers, and may, at least temporarily, increase inequality of 
income and wealth (Kuznets 1955). As a consequence, social and political tensions rise 
and the probability of abusive actions increases. To test these theoretical considerations, 
we employ GDP per capita and GDP growth in our analysis.
6 
  Holding resources constant, scarcity of goods (and thus the potential for conflict) 
is higher in countries with larger populations (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). Here 
the issue of distributing resources fairly among citizens becomes more crucial (Burkhart 
2002). Moreover, the number of occurrences of coercive action is likely to be higher in a 
large population, simply as a matter of numbers. Population growth increases the scarcity 
of products and resources. Furthermore, rapid population growth increases the percentage 
of younger people in terms of the total population, which as a group is generally more 
destabilizing (Poe and Tate 1994). Therefore, both population size and population growth 
may increase the probability of repressive governmental actions. In addition to these two 
variables, we incorporate a country’s area and urban population in order to control for 
potential rural-urban differences.  
  It is more or less a tautology that the probability of repressive actions increases if 
the country is governed by a repressive regime. Military regimes depend on the power of 
the armed forces, and conflicts are frequently solved by military order and hierarchy. 
                                                 
5 We further account for the level of democracy by controlling for the timing of elections, the age of the 
state and its political actors, federal states and their representation as well as the presence of special interest 
executive parties. 
6 As additional variables measuring economic development and growth, we use the Human Development 
Index, investment, education, proxies for a country’s debt level, life expectancy and decentralization 
measures.    6
Hence, military regimes are most likely to control a country through abusive actions and 
disrespect of human rights whenever possible. Similarly, “leftist regimes,” which are 
defined as socialist or communist governments that do “not allow effective electoral 
competition with nonsocialist opposition” (Poe and Tate 1994: 858), which is based on 
the Marxist-Leninist theory that there is a need for the dictatorship of the proletariat, are 
most likely to show less respect for human rights. Mitchell and McCormick (1988), for 
instance, provide clear evidence for both hypotheses. We therefore include dummies for 
socialist legal origin, left-wing governments, and military dictators. 
  There is also some discussion surrounding the cultural influence of past colonial 
powers. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) and Burkhart (2002) argue that the colonial 
experience has prejudiced the shape of present postcolonial political culture, and that the 
British colonial experience, in contrast to other experiences, was associated with 
postcolonial development of democracy. British cultural influence in this sense is 
therefore assumed to involve greater respect for human rights. 
  Finally, Poe and Tate point out that experience with external or internal war 
increases the probability of human rights violations. As Burkhart (2002: 158) puts it, civil 
liberties “disappear in even the most democratic of countries come wartime.” We 
measure war experience with a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if, in a given year, 1000 
battlefield casualties occurred as a result of a civil and/or international war. 
  In addition to these standard variables proposed by Poe and Tate, the current 
literature has introduced a number of other potential determinants of human rights. The 
colonial legacy aspect of their model is a potential effect of former globalization. Besides 
the positive effect of British cultural influence, it can also be argued that Iberian (Spanish 
and Portuguese) colonies were based on strict hierarchy, authority, absolutism, and two-
class systems, and may therefore be more likely to display a political culture that tolerates 
political repression and human rights violations as a means of maintaining order today 
(Inglehart 1988). Hence, we also include a variable controlling for Iberian cultural 
influence.
7  
  Another important aspect related to colonialism is religion. The potential 
                                                 
7 Besides being a former British colony, we also control for whether the legal origin is British, French, 
German or Scandinavian. See La Porta et al. (2008) for a detailed summary of the economic consequences 
of legal origin.   7
difference between Iberian and British influence—if it exists—could originate from 
different religions. While Orthodox and Roman-Catholic churches have hierarchal and 
authoritarian structures, these are much less pronounced in Protestant churches. 
According to the “habituation explanation,” proposed by Gurr (1986) and Davenport 
(1996), Protestant societies may be more tolerant as they have been suppressed by the 
Catholic mainstream. Arruñada (2010: 895) argues that “Protestants show greater 
concern for social interactions, in terms of at least social control, rule of law and 
homogeneity of values.” Using survey data for 32 countries, he finds substantial evidence 
supporting this “social ethic” hypothesis. Basically, all major religions (in principle) 
teach peaceful and respectful human interaction. However, different ecclesiastic 
organization and traditions could affect the average respect its members have for human 
rights, especially in relation to followers of a different religion. Therefore, we test both 
whether countries with one dominant religion tend to have more respect for human rights, 
or if this respect is reduced when minorities are subject to repression.  
  An aspect which has not yet been directly considered is ethnic fractionalization, 
as well as other types of societal division. As argued above, the likelihood of a society 
being fractionalized increases with the size of its population. Moreover, it is obvious that 
in multiethnic countries (especially when they have only been independent for a short 
time), the probability of conflict is significantly higher. Illustrative examples are the 
conflicts and human rights practices in former multiethnic states like the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Divisions of any kind may increase the probability of 
human rights violations. 
  Recently, the role of major international organizations and their effects on human 
rights has come under scrutiny. Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006, 2009) examine the role 
that World Bank and IMF programs play in human rights violations. On the one hand, if 
the World Bank and the IMF improve economic performance, this could lead to better 
human rights practices. On the other hand, the conditionality attached to loans from the 
two institutions could cause hardships and higher levels of domestic conflict, which could 
then reduce the level of respect for human rights. Abouharb and Cingranelli find that 
World Bank and IMF involvements deteriorate the human rights situation in borrowing   8
countries.
8 
  Huntington’s (1968: 41) finding that “[…] causes of violence in [... poor 
countries] lay with the modernization process rather than with the backwardness itself” 
addresses another important aspect related to the influence of the level of economic 
development and growth discussed above, and a potential (indirect) link to economic 
freedom. In times of transition (modernization), economic freedom increases and the 
state is reorganized: “As social and economic change broadens, political participation 
increases, and the demands [...] are greater.” Hence, traditional sources of political 
authority are challenged. New political institutions are required to channel this newly 
mobilized citizenry. While these new institutions develop, instability, disorder and 
corresponding human rights abuses arise. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) assume that 
both very poor and very rich countries are therefore less likely to have substantial levels 
of human rights violations, but that those countries in the middle—due to the 
modernization process they are moving through—are more likely to exhibit patterns of 
human rights violations. Taking this into account, there should be a non-linear 




On the basis of the previous theoretical and empirical literature, this section derives our 
hypotheses regarding the link between liberal policies and governments’ respect for 
human rights. Our hypotheses comprise two dimensions of freedom, an internal 
dimension covered by economic freedom within an economy, and an external dimension 
covered by three dimensions of worldwide integration (globalization). To some extent, 
both globalization and economic freedom imply a free domestic and a free world market.  
3.1  Globalization and Human Rights Abuses 
Economic, social and political integration can have different effects on the human rights 
situation in a specific country. The two sub-categories of the human rights measure from 
                                                 
8 We complement IMF and World Bank lending variables with the number of human rights NGOs present 
in a country. Simmons and Danner (2010: 225) demonstrate how ratification of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) to prosecute war crimes is a useful step for “some governments to commit to ratchet down 
violence and get on the road to peaceful negotiations.”   9
Cingranelli and Richards (2006)—physical integrity rights and empowerment rights—
might both be affected in different ways by the three types of globalization. If we neglect 
this complexity, we will most likely end up with confusing or contradicting results. 
  As a matter of fact, the literature regarding the relationship between economic 
globalization and human rights does yield contradicting results. On the one hand, Evans 
(1999) argues that economic integration in trade and investment generates incentives for 
governments to abuse poor and disenfranchised people, so that repression, exploitation 
and human rights abuses arise. On the other hand, Apodaca (2001), Mitchell and 
McCormick (1988), Poe and Tate (1994) as well as Rosenau (2003) argue that economic 
integration produces economic wealth, the establishment of the rule of law and a higher 
respect for human rights and (personal) freedom. Gelleny and McCoy (2001), as well as 
Mitchell and McCormick (1988), also maintain that due to increased wealth and 
modernization, global integration leads to a higher level of political stability, so that 
governments are less tempted to violate human rights to maintain control. Similarly, 
Richards et al. (2001) state that globalization forms a “middle-class,” which has the 
power to demand (fundamental) human rights and freedom.  
  While globalization may increase the size of the pie, according to Rosenau (2003) 
it may be distributed less equally. This may increase the potential for conflict and human 
rights abuses. Indeed, Hafner-Burton (2005) does not find evidence that economic 
integration (measured by total trade as a percentage of GDP) has a significant impact on 
repression, but finds that in export-led countries, the probability of repression rises with 
high levels of export flows.  
  Internal and external conflict, ethnic tension, law and order, and democratic 
accountability of governments are among the indicators that are of the most significance 
for the activities of multinational corporations (Busse and Hefeker 2007). If countries 
become involved in an unanticipated war, the probability of receiving foreign direct 
investment decreases, as does the magnitude of such investments (Li 2006). Hence, 
human rights abuses should decrease with a country’s level of economic globalization. 
Since economic globalization brings advantages for governments that participate in 
economic integration (Dreher 2006a), regimes have an incentive to respect human rights. 
There are theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence that suggest trade or   10
economic globalization reduce conflict in a country, because “the possible loss of trade 
reduces the willingness ... to fight” (Morrow 1999: 481; see also Li and Sacko 2002; 
Iqbal and Zorn 2006).  
  Von Hayek (1960) argued that free trade and capital flows would lead to 
economic development, fostering the demand for democracy. Eichengreen and Leblang 
(2008) provide evidence for a mutual positive relationship between trade and democracy 
(an exception being labor-scarce countries).
9 In line with hypothesis (i) of Poe and Tate’s 
model, this is another argument for economic globalization improving human rights 
practices. These considerations lead to our first hypothesis: 
 
  Hypothesis 1: Economic globalization improves a country’s human rights  
   practice. 
  
The success of companies operating globally is dependent on aspects like reputation, 
which means that these companies also have an incentive to uphold international human 
rights and basic labor standards if non-commitment is likely to become globally 
transparent. As the social integration aspect of globalization proceeds—for instance via 
the internet and other global communication media—the likelihood of human rights 
violations being discovered increases, and the negative effect of being caught magnifies. 
The skill revolution makes it easy to follow news about violations, however distant they 
may be (Rosenau 2003). Moreover, due to an increasing worldwide network of NGOs 
and other private groups (which is one aspect of social integration), the pressure on 
human rights violating regimes also rises.
10 Hence, Rosenau (2003) points to the 
increased ease of mobilizing human rights supporters as a consequence of social 
globalization. Resistance against human rights violations can form more easily compared 
to a world where news spread less quickly.
11 As one part of social globalization, 
                                                 
9 For recent work on this topic see also Iqbal and Zorn (2006). 
10 One example for this is Nike, which has had numerous “issues” where it was claimed by various NGOs 
that they were exploiting workers and using child labor in production. In 2001, Nike responded by 
providing a “corporate responsibility report,” in which it admitted that child labor was used and promised 
to stop this practice (Boggan 2001). 
11 As one example, Rosenau (2003) points to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, where media coverage 
arguably played a role.    11
international groups and networks are formed with the explicit goal of opposing 
repressive regimes. Successful concepts can then easily be identified and copied.
12  
Social globalization can generate massive international pressure on a government 
or enterprise. Hence, social globalization produces internationally recognized social 
norms that give governments, politicians, and managers an incentive to follow (Akerlof 
1980; Bernheim 1994). If a country is highly dependent on tourism, social globalization 
offers a chance to attract tourists, but at the same time it incorporates the risk of losing 
them due to the negative publicity of human rights abuses. Overall, the increased 
visibility from social globalization can make governments all over the world feel more 
obliged to publicly react to such violations. Thus, social globalization should function as 
an incentive device against human rights abuses by increasing the ramifications of such 
abuses. Moreover, Rosenau (2003) argues that another channel of social globalization is 
the direct effect of immigration (and tourism) on the potential acceptance of different 
lifestyles, be it the acceptance of different religions, ethnicity, gender or sexual 
preferences. This reduces the potential for conflict and human rights abuses. 
Hafner-Burton (2008), however, provides evidence that repressive governments 
criticized by NGOs, news media and international organizations, often strategically 
reduce particular forms of violations by offsetting this improvement with increased 
violations in other areas. As Rosenau (2003) points out, the skill revolution enables 
perpetrators, as well as victims, to respond to mobilizing powers: “It is worth recalling 
that a major consequence of the skill revolution is the growing capacity of people 
everywhere to know when, where, and how to engage in collective action, a capacity that 
can be just as easily put to the service of opposing as supporting what are regarded as 
human rights violations” (322-323).
13 Migration flows lead to negative reactions by 
native citizens, in some countries giving rise to the success of right-wing parties and 
repressive policies. Still, on balance, we expect the positive effects of social globalization 
to dominate. We thus test the hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
12 Rosenau (2003) proposes the example of land acquisition by the Inuit in Canada, which has been 
facilitated by the adaptation of successful concepts from other parts of the world. 
13 Rosenau (2003) points to the example of General Pinochet’s custody in the United Kingdom, where 
Chilean crowds demonstrated both in favor and against his detention.   12
  Hypothesis 2: Social globalization improves a country’s human rights   
   practice. 
 
Compliance with social norms originates from several sources—due to metanorms, 
dominance, internalization, deterrence, social proof, membership, law, or reputation 
(Axelrod 1986). Neighbor states and the international community could punish human 
rights abuses, though this sword proved to be rather blunt in cases such as the Darfur 
conflict. Membership in particular international organizations provides advantages that 
member countries do not want to jeopardize by allowing human rights abuses to occur.
14 
This leads us to the third dimension of globalization—political globalization. 
  The European integration process via the European Union (EU) is an example of 
the positive role political integration can play in encouraging human rights. Potential new 
members will only be affiliated, and win the substantial benefits of membership, if they 
fulfill a number of preconditions. For instance, members have to sign the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
15 as well as 
other standards. Human rights abuses are prosecuted by the European Court of Human 
Rights. The sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council and other supra-national 
organizations to punish human rights violations are further instances where political 
globalization might, at least to a small extent, affect human rights. Regarding prosecution 
of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the UN established the 
International Criminal Court (ICC); for Ex-Yugoslavia and Ruanda there were extra 
courts established to punish the culprits. Hence, political integration should improve a 
government’s respect for human rights. 
  An opposing view, first expressed by Chomsky and Herman (1979), and still 
being discussed today, argues that the amount of human rights violations would rise with 
the degree of economic association with power blocks like the United States or the 
                                                 
14 Sometimes international organizations are also abused, however. Vreeland (2008) shows that 
dictatorships that practice torture are more likely to sign the UN Convention Against Torture compared to 
dictatorships that do not engage in torture. He argues that acceding to the convention is a concession 
dictatorships are willing to make to appease the domestic opposition. 
15 The states of South- and Middle-America have also developed an American Convention of Human 
Rights.   13
European Union (Mitchell and McCormick 1988). According to this line of argument, 
developed economies further their own interests, for example through reforms at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) or regional trade unions like the NAFTA (Stiglitz 
2006). The formation of international organizations such as the WTO, NAFTA and the 
European Union, improve these nations’ ability to build beneficial asymmetric global 
trade relations and other forms of power policy. As world markets are increasingly 
controlled by these power blocks, investment conditions are altered to the disadvantage 
of poorer nations, with persistent unemployment rising as a result (Stiglitz 2006). This 
power policy may prolong the impoverishment of countries in a stage of transition or 
backwardness (Stiglitz 2006). Following Poe and Tate (1994), this would impair human 
rights practices. 
  Though both arguments appear to be correct in practice,
16 we assume that, on 
average, political globalization improves human rights practices: 
 
  Hypothesis 3: Political globalization improves human rights practice. 
 
Thus, overall, we expect all three dimensions of globalization to improve governments’ 
respect for human rights (on average). We next turn to the impact of economic freedom 
on human rights. 
3.2  Economic Freedom and Human Rights Abuses 
Economic freedom is the “degree to which a market economy is in place, where the 
central components are voluntary exchange, free competition, and protection of persons 
and property” (Berggren 2003: 193) and a limited degree of interventionism in the form 
of government ownership, regulations, and taxes.
17 There is clear evidence that economic 
freedom fosters growth-enhancing incentives (Berggren 2003; de Haan and Sturm 2003). 
Economic freedom promotes high returns on productive efforts, and it enables individuals 
to allocate their talent and capital where it generates the highest value (Murphy et al. 
1991). It is a precondition for (economic) globalization because it promotes foreign 
                                                 
16 Stiglitz (2006) discusses both arguments in a broader context. 
17 Economic freedom differs from political freedom (equal participation in political process, competition 
for political power, free and fair elections) and civil freedom (protection against unreasonable visitation, 
access to fair trials, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of speech) (Berggren 2003: 194).    14
capital investment and the flow of trade towards preference satisfaction and highest 
return. Based on hypothesis (ii) of Poe and Tate’s model, economic freedom should 
reduce human rights abuses.  
  As outlined above, a particular number of freedoms characterize democracies. 
Hence, there is a direct link to the literature on economic freedom and democracy (e.g., 
de Haan and Sturm 2003): While economic freedom promotes free markets, political 
freedom promotes democracy, so that both types of freedom are part of the same story. If 
economic freedom is significantly correlated with democracy, then hypothesis (i) of Poe 
and Tate’s model suggests that an indirect nexus exists between economic freedom and 
regard for human rights via its common link to democracy.
18 
However, when looking back at the industrial revolution in Europe, we find a 
potentially negative effect of economic freedom on human rights. Entrepreneurs more or 
less had the right to treat their laborers in whichever way they saw fit. Political and 
economic leaders’ interests went hand in hand, and economic freedom was exclusively 
developed towards the advantage of citizens owning property. As large parts of society 
were poor, exploitation and further impoverishment of complete swathes of land 
occurred. Laborers had to work under degrading conditions, child labor was widespread, 
and laborers were disenfranchised (Marx 2002).
19  
Today, in the countries where the industrial revolution originated, economic 
freedom is still comparably high, but Europe is nevertheless well known for a markedly 
good human rights record. Marx’s (1950) hypothesis that private property and a 
capitalistic system inevitably lead to disaster has not been proven to be true, arguably 
because the countries developed social security systems and labor protection standards, 
and the like, which reduced economic freedom but ensured greater respect for human 
rights. However, globalization might now spread a system of (pure) capitalism all over 
the world, so Marx’s suspicion concerning economic freedom is indeed topical again. We 
thus test the following hypothesis:
  
  Hypothesis 4: Economic freedom improves a country’s human rights   
   practice. 
                                                 
18 Burkhart (2002) assumes a similar (indirect) effect of capitalism and human rights through democracy.  
19 For example, Marx (2002: 239-240) cites a Justice of the Peace in Nottingham, who labels the working 
conditions in England in 1860 as ‘slavery in social, bodily, ethically and mental respect’.    15
4. Measuring  Human  Rights 
Our definition of citizens’ human rights follows Cingranelli and Richards (1999). Their 
Human Rights Dataset (CIRI, Cingranelli and Richards 2006) was specifically designed 
to allow for the testing of theories about causes and consequences of human rights 
violations and is widely used to do so.
20 It provides quantitative information on 
governments’ respect for various internationally recognized human rights, on an annual 
basis and for almost all countries around the world.
21 
The CIRI measure draws from two sources, the U.S. Department of State’s 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and from Amnesty International’s (AI) 
Annual Reports. Both offer detailed descriptions of human rights practices for most 
countries in the world. They are analyzed by country experts who code the human rights 
situation in a particular country and year on an ordinal scale. Each country is evaluated 
by at least two trained experts, following a very detailed set of instructions.
22 Note that 
Cingranelli and Richards focus on actual human rights-related actions of governments, 
including all government agencies, such as police and military. In particular, the CIRI 
data refer to extrajudicial killings, people who have disappeared for political reasons, 
torture, political imprisonment, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of 
movement, political participation, and worker’s rights. Each variable is coded on an 
ordinal scale, ranging between 0-2 and, depending on the variable considered, 0-4, where 
higher values reflect a better rating in the respective human rights dimension.
23  
  In this paper we focus on two composite indicators provided by Cingranelli and 
Richards (1999) and Richards et al. (2001). The first composite index refers to physical 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Richards (1999), Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006, 2009), Goodlifee and Hawkins (2006), 
United Nations (2006), Blume and Voigt (2007), or Dreher et al. (2010). 
21 Note that we therefore do not investigate human rights violations from non-governmental actors. See 
Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) for a discussion. 
22 The detailed coding rules are fixed in a coding manual and available from the CIRI Human Rights Data 
Project (http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation.asp, accessed April 15, 2008).  
23 The scoring of the ordinal indices rests on events-based criteria. While the exact description of how the 
individual dimensions are coded is not reproduced here due to space restraints, consider political or 
extrajudicial killings as an example. “Practically frequent” killings are coded as “zero,” when more than 50 
people have been killed in a particular year and country. “Practices occasionally” is coded as “one” when 
between 1-49 people have been killed, while a value of “two” is assigned when no killing occurred. As 
Cingranelli and Richards (1999) and Richards et al. (2001) show employing Mokken Scale Analysis, the 
government’s decision to violate the individual rights is unidimensional. They can thus be aggregated to 
overall indices.   16
integrity rights, which measures the absence of torture, extrajudicial killings, political 
imprisonments, and disappearance, on a scale of 0-8. The second composite refers to 
empowerment rights and comprises the freedom of movement, freedom of speech, 
workers’ rights, political participation, and freedom of religion, ranging from 0-10.
24 
Higher values represent better human rights practices. Appendix A gives a more detailed 
description of these components.
25  





























The upper line in Figure 1 shows the time path of the unweighted average of the physical 
integrity index for OECD countries over the 1981-2004 period. The lower line represents 
the average for low income countries,
26 while the unweighted world average is shown in 
the middle. The number of countries covered rises from 125 in 1981, to 179 in 2004. The 
figure shows that the mean of the world index was fairly constant over time at a value of 
around 5. However, a substantial drop did occur around 1990. The average for the OECD 
countries is also rather constant over time, but at a higher level of around 7. Figure 1 
shows that there is some variation in physical integrity for developing countries, with a 
substantial negative trend. The level of physical integrity peaked at 5 in 1981, fell to a 
                                                 
24 The correlation between the physical integrity index and the empowerment index is 0.51. Thus, the two 
indicators seem to be covering different aspects of human rights.  
25 Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009) discuss the limitations of the CIRI data in measuring human rights. 
26 Countries with low income are those with a 2004 GNI per capita of a maximum of $US 825, according to 
the World Bank (2009) definition.   17
low point of 3.2 in 1990, rose to 4 in 1995, and after declining again until 2000, was 
slightly below 4 in 2004. 





























Figure 2 shows the development of empowerment rights. As can be seen, the average 
level of empowerment rose steadily over the period of observation (except in 2003), with 
similar developments in developing and OECD countries. The most substantial increase 
in empowerment was experienced in 1990, particularly in low income countries.
27 The 
index mean is 4.6 for low income countries, more than 9 in OECD countries, and 5.9 for 
the world sample. Since 1996 we observe a negative trend in low-income countries, 
which started to reverse at the end of the sample period. The world sample contains 130 
countries in 1981 and 181 in 2004. 
 
5.  Measures of Economic Freedom and Globalization 
The measure of globalization that we employ is the KOF Index of Globalization 
developed in Dreher (2006a).
28 It is based on 24 variables that relate to different 
                                                 
27 The apparent increase in low income countries from 1990 to 1991 is mainly driven by Mali, The 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Togo (increases of 4, 5 and 9 points, respectively). The decline in 2003 
is mainly driven by Bangladesh, the Central African Republic, India, and Cambodia (all of which decreased 
by 5 points). 
28 We use the 2009 version of this index as documented in Dreher et al. (2008) which is available at 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/.   18
dimensions of globalization. These dimensions are combined into three sub-indices—
economic, political and social globalization—and one overall index of globalization.  
  More specifically, economic globalization is defined to have two dimensions. 
First, actual economic flows—trade, FDI, portfolio investment, foreign income 
payments—are taken to be measures of globalization. The second sub-index refers to 
restrictions on trade and capital flows, using hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, 
taxes on international trade and an index of capital controls.  
  The KOF index classifies social globalization in three categories.
29 The first 
covers personal contacts, the second includes data on information flows and the third 
measures cultural proximity. The personal contacts index is intended to capture the direct 
interaction among people living in different countries. It includes international telecom 
traffic (outgoing traffic in minutes per subscriber), international letters sent and received, 
and the degree of tourism (incoming and outgoing) a country’s population is exposed to. 
Government and workers’ transfers received and paid (as a percentage of GDP) measure 
whether, and to what extent, countries interact, while the stock of foreign population is 
included to capture existing interactions with people from other countries. The number of 
international letters sent and received measure direct interaction among people living in 
different countries. 
  While personal contact data are meant to capture measurable interactions among 
people from different countries, the sub-index on information flows is meant to measure 
the potential flow of ideas and images. It includes the number of internet users, cable 
television subscribers, number of radios and daily newspapers traded. To some extent, all 
these variables proxy people’s potential for receiving news from other countries – they 
thus contribute to the global spread of ideas and events.  
  Cultural proximity is arguably the dimension of globalization which is most 
difficult to grasp. According to Saich (2000), cultural globalization in large part refers to 
the domination of U.S. cultural products. Arguably, the United States is the trendsetter in 
much of the global socio-cultural realm (Rosendorf 2000). As proxy for cultural 
proximity, the number of McDonald’s restaurants located in a country is included. For 
                                                 
29 Similar proxies for globalization are used elsewhere (e.g., Iqbal and Zorn 2006). See Dreher et al. (2008) 
for a survey.   19
many people, the global spread of McDonald’s is synonymous with globalization itself. 
However, the number of IKEA (per capita) located in a country is also included. 
Imported and exported books (relative to GDP) are used to proxy the extent to which 
beliefs and values move across national borders. 
  To proxy the degree of political globalization, the number of embassies and high 
commissions in a country, the number of international organizations in which the country 
is a member, the number of international treaties ratified, and the number of UN peace 
missions a country participated in are used. 
  In constructing the indices of globalization, each of the variables is transformed to 
an index on a scale of one to one hundred, where one hundred is the maximum value for 
a specific variable and one is the minimum value. Higher values denote greater 
globalization. The data are transformed according to the percentiles of the original 
distribution. The weights for calculating the sub-indices are determined using principal 
components analysis for the entire sample of countries and years. The index is widely 
used as proxy for globalization in the recent literature.
30 
Turning to our measure of economic freedom, we employ the index provided by 
the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson 2008). The data is available in five year-
intervals over the period 1970-2000, and on a yearly basis thereafter. It covers five broad 
categories of market-oriented policies and institutions: Size of Government (Area 1), 
Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (Area 2), Access to Sound Money (Area 
3), Exchange with Foreigners (Area 4), and Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business 
(Area 5). Each index ranges from 0-10, with 10 indicating the highest level of economic 
freedom. As an alternative, we employ a second standard measure of economic freedom, 
that being the index developed by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal 
(see Miller and Holmes 2009). Their Index of Economic Freedom is measured on a scale 
of 0 to 100 and is calculated as the mean of ten sub-components, which are measured on 
the same scale. The areas covered are Business, Trade, Money, Government, Fiscal 
Policy, Property Rights, Investment, Financial Freedom, Corruption, and Labor, where 
higher values indicate an economic environment or set of policies more conducive to 
economic freedom.  
                                                 
30 See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/papers/ for an extensive list of articles using the index.   20
 
6.  Data and Method 
We estimate pooled time-series cross-section (panel data) regressions. The yearly data 
extend to a maximum of 106 countries and cover the 1981-2004 period. Since some of 
the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the 
number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables.  
To test our hypotheses we estimate equations of the following form: 
it t t i t i it u Z RIGHTS RIGHTS         , 2 1 , 1 , (1) 
where RIGHTSit represents our measure of human rights in country i at year t, and 
Z is a vector containing the variables testing for our hypotheses, as introduced below. 
Finally, μt are time fixed effects and uit is a well behaved error term. Note that we also 
include the lagged dependent variable, as human rights develop only slowly over time. 
Following the previous literature, we estimate our model employing ordered probit, with 
standard errors clustered at the country level. As a consequence, we cannot control for 
fixed country effects, as the resulting estimates would be biased due to the incidental 
parameter problem. 
Before turning to the specific variables employed to test our hypotheses, we have 
to set up a baseline specification. As discussed above, the model of Poe and Tate (1994) 
gives guidance to what the core determinants of human rights are. Besides these, 
however, there is little consensus on what the additional determinants are, if any. Hence, 
we face the challenge of coming up with a robust empirical model. We tackle this 
problem by employing (variants of) the extreme bounds analysis (EBA), as proposed by 
Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992). EBA enables us to examine whether the 
proposed variables are indeed robust determinants of human rights, independent of which 
additional variables are also included in the set of control variables.  
To conduct an EBA, equations of the following general form are estimated: 
        Z F M RIGHTS Z F M , (2) 
where RIGHTS is the measure of human rights, M is a vector of “commonly accepted” 
explanatory variables and F is a vector containing the variables of interest. The vector Z 
contains up to three possible additional explanatory variables (as in Levine and Renelt 
1992), which, according to the broader literature, are related to the dependent variable.   21
The error term is . The EBA-test for a variable in F states that if the lower extreme 
bound for βF—i.e., the lowest value for βF minus two standard deviations—is negative, 
while the upper extreme bound for βF—i.e., the highest value for βF plus two standard 
deviations—is positive, the variable F is not robustly related to RIGHTS. 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that this criterion is far too strong for any variable to 
pass. If the distribution of the parameter of interest has both positive and negative 
support, then a researcher is bound to find at least one regression model for which the 
estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. Consequently, in what 
follows, not only do we report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the 
regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is statistically different from zero at 
the five percent level. 
Moreover, instead of analyzing only the extreme bounds of the estimates of the 
coefficient for a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) recommended 
procedure and analyze the entire distribution. Accordingly, we also report the unweighted 
parameter estimate of βF and its standard error, as well as the unweighted cumulative 
distribution function, CDF(0). The latter represents the proportion of the cumulative 
distribution function lying on each side of zero. CDF(0) indicates the larger of the areas 
under the density function either above or below zero. So CDF(0) always lies between 
0.5 and 1.0. However, in contrast to Sala-i-Martin, we use the unweighted, instead of the 
weighted, CDF(0).
31 
As we follow Poe and Tate (1994), our M vector consists of the following 
variables: A proxy for democracy (Polity IV), population size, GDP per capita, a set of 
dummy variables controlling for legal origin, plus a dummy variable indicating the 
presence of a civil and/or international war (and the lagged dependent variable). 
As detailed in section 2, we have collected a total of 52 variables potentially 
influencing the level of human rights to test competing theoretical and empirical findings. 
                                                 
31 Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the integrated likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0). However, 
missing observations for some of the variables pose a problem. Sturm and de Haan (2002) show that the 
goodness-of-fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and 
that the weights constructed in this way are not invariant to linear transformations of the dependent 
variable. Hence, changing scales could result in different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore employ 
the unweighted version. Furthermore, due to our unbalanced panel setup, we are unable to use the extension 
of the EBA called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) as introduced by Sala-i-Martin et al. 
(2004).   22
All variables and their sources are listed in Appendix A. After evaluating the robustness 
of the baseline specification, including these variables in all possible combinations of up 
to three, each of these variables is included in the base vector singularly (i.e., represents 
the variable in the F vector), while the remaining 51 variables are used in the Z vector. 
Thus, the first part of the analysis evaluates whether the variables in the base model are 
robustly related to human rights practice. The second part shows whether additional 
variables should be among the explanatory variables when testing for the impact of 
globalization and economic freedom on human rights practice.
32 
The next section reports the results for the EBA; results for our specific 
hypotheses follow below. 
 
7. Findings 
7.1 EBA  Results 
The results for the EBA baseline models are presented in Table 1, while results for the 
additional variables are presented in Appendix B. In order to take account of the two-
sided nature of the test, we follow Sturm and de Haan’s (2005) proposal to use a CDF(0) 
value of 0.95 as a threshold for which variables we consider to be robust. The upper panel 
of Table 1 shows the results for physical integrity rights, while the lower panel reports 
those for empowerment rights. As can be seen from both panels, the lagged dependent 
variable is clearly a robust determinant of current levels, with both CDF(0)s being equal 
to one. The results also show that all additional variables included in the baseline model 
are robust determinants of physical integrity rights. In line with Poe and Tate, less 
populous and more democratic countries have higher levels of human rights. Protection 
of physical integrity rights is also more pronounced in wealthier countries, measured by 
per capita GDP. Wars robustly reduce governments’ respect for physical integrity rights. 
In terms of legal origin, the four dummies are also robust determinants of physical 
integrity rights. When calculating F-tests for their joint significance, the average p-value 
amounts to 0.02, indicating the joint significance of the legal origin dummies. We find 
                                                 
32 Note that multicollinearity is not a major concern. Out of the 1771 pairwise correlations of the variables 
in the EBA, only 8 show a correlation of greater than 0.8.   23
that relative to Scandinavian legal origin (the omitted benchmark category) all other 
country groups show less respect for physical integrity rights.  
While the results imply that the baseline variables chosen for the M-vector on 
theoretical grounds are well matched to the data for physical integrity rights, the lower 
part of Table 1 shows that this holds to a lesser extent for empowerment rights. All 
coefficients are of the same sign as for physical integrity rights. However, only 
democracy exceeds the threshold of a CDF(0) of 0.95 and can therefore be considered as 
a robust determinant of empowerment rights. Population, per capita GDP, and war 
experiences are no robust determinants of empowerment rights. The legal origin dummies 
are, at least individually, also not robust. Note, however, that the average p-value for their 
joint significance is 0.08, indicating the joint significance of these dummies. 
The results reported in appendix B show that the bulk of the remaining 52 control 
variables are not robust predictors of human rights. In fact, regarding physical integrity 
rights, none of the 52 variables passes the strict threshold of 0.95. Six variables pass the 
lower threshold of a CDF(0) of 0.90 suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997), however. All of 
them have the expected signs. Older democracies and states with a longer history of 
independence show greater respect for human rights. More FDI inflows, as proxy for one 
area of globalization, are associated with less human rights violations, as are the years the 
chief executive is in office and the number of government tiers. The latter two results 
imply that political stability and checks and balances promote human rights. In line with 
theory, human rights violations are more frequent in former Iberian colonies. 
With respect to empowerment rights, the share of Protestants turns out to be a 
robust determinant according to the stricter threshold. As described in section 2, 
Protestants seem to be more tolerant and thus show greater respect for human rights. Four 
additional variables come close to our threshold: Population growth, the number of 
human rights NGOs, the share of the dominant religion and the dummy for left-wing 
governments. Population growth and a high share of a dominant religion seem to be 
detrimental to human rights practice, while human rights organizations and left-wing 
governments seem to be associated with less human rights violations. The latter finding 
might seem at odds with Poe and Tate (1994), but our dummy of left-wing governments 
typically refers to (social) democrats rather than socialists.   24
When testing our specific hypotheses below, we include all variables with a 
CDF(0) exceeding 0.95 to avoid the possibility of omitted variable bias. We tested for the 
robustness of our results, including those variables exceeding the lower threshold of 0.90 
as well.
33 
7.2  Hypotheses Tests  
Table 2 shows the results for physical integrity rights, based on more than 2000 
observations. Note that a potentially non-linear effect of GDP per capita could not be 
tested in the EBA framework, as in a non-linear model such as ordered probit a simple t-
test on the squared term is meaningless (Ai and Norton 2003). One way of testing for the 
statistical significance of the squared GDP per capita term is via a likelihood-ratio test 
(Greene 2010). However, this cannot be done in a meaningful way in the EBA. We 
therefore present two sets of results here: One with, and one without the squared term. 
For all models, likelihood-ratio tests provide evidence for a better fit when including the 
squared term at the one percent level of significance. For the non-linear models, we also 
report the turning point in terms of GDP per capita (PPP adjusted). As reported at the 
bottom of the table, the turning point fluctuates between US$ 2800-4800.  
Turning to our variables of interest, we start by including one dimension of 
integration at a time and then include them jointly. Column 1-9 report the results 
excluding GDP per capita squared, while columns 10-18 include the squared term. 
According to column 1, governments’ respect for physical integrity rights increases with 
economic integration, at the one percent level of significance. This is line with 
Hypothesis 1. The same holds true when we substitute economic globalization for social 
globalization (in column 2) or political globalization (column 3). Therefore, Hypotheses 
2 and 3 are also supported by the data. Column 4 includes the overall KOF Index of 
Globalization instead, which is significant at the one percent level, with a positive 
coefficient, as expected.  
With respect to economic freedom, we find evidence for Hypothesis 4. Column 5 
includes the Fraser index. The result shows that, at the five percent level of significance, 
governments’ respect for physical integrity rights increases with greater freedom. Note 
                                                 
33 All our results reported in Tables 2 and 3 remain qualitatively unchanged. The additional results are 
available on request.   25
however, that the number of observations is reduced to 611, due to missing data on 
economic freedom for many years. Column 6 therefore includes the same index, but 
linearly interpolates the data in the years with missing observations. The result confirms 
the previous finding, at the one percent level of significance.
34 When using the index 
provided by Heritage as an alternative (column 7), the coefficient is marginally 
insignificant. 
As argued above, not accounting for all dimensions of integration might lead to an 
omitted variable bias. Therefore, we include all three indices of globalization jointly with 
the (interpolated) Fraser index. As can be seen, economic globalization is no longer 
significant at conventional levels, which might be due to multicollinearity. When we 
enter the KOF Index of Globalization jointly with the Fraser index, both are significant at 
the one percent level. 
The results are very similar when squared per capita GDP is also included. The 
exception is that economic freedom measured by the Heritage index is now significant at 
the ten percent level (in column 16), and that social globalization becomes marginally 
insignificant when included jointly with the two other dimensions of globalization and 
the Fraser index.  
Interestingly, the political dimension of globalization seems to dominate the 
economic and social dimensions. If this were true, human rights policy should 
concentrate on pushing political integration. However, we do not know whether the 
economic and social dimensions are really irrelevant to human rights, or whether 
multicollinearity exists among the individual dimensions, which does not allow us to 
identify their effect. Overall, we conclude that the data support our hypotheses well, even 
if some ambiguity regarding the relevance of the economic and social dimensions 
remains. 
Table 3 replicates the analysis focusing on empowerment rights. In line with the 
results for the EBA above, population and per capita GDP are not significant at 
conventional levels in most specifications (when GDP per capita squared is excluded). 
The same holds for war experiences and the dummies for legal origin. The dummies are, 
                                                 
34 When interpolating the data, we have to correct the standard errors to account for this. We do so by 
bootstrapping the standard errors with 1000 repetitions.   26
however, jointly significant at the five percent level in all specifications, except those 
shown in columns 7 and 16. Note that according to the likelihood-ratio test, the model 
including GDP per capita squared again fits the data better. The implied turning point is 
similar to the one above, between US$ 3100-6000. 
The results show that social globalization seems to be the only dimension of 
globalization which is robustly related to empowerment rights. The overall index of 
globalization is significant at the five percent level when GDP per capita squared is 
excluded (in column 5), but not significant at conventional levels with its inclusion 
(columns 13 and 18). To some extent, this could be explained by the fact that, in contrast 
to physical integrity rights, empowerment rights are not guaranteed to the same degree by 
international treaties (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009). There is no clear consensus in the 
global community as to how these rights are exactly defined. Hence, the effect of liberal 
policies is likely to be more heterogeneous on empowerment, as compared to physical 
integrity rights, which makes it difficult to find statistically significant effects. Due to a 
lack of consensus, even the Western democracies prefer to focus on the more important 
physical integrity rights, neglecting fuzzy empowerment rights at the political stage. For 
similar reasons, economic integration may not bear a significant effect. 
With respect to economic freedom, the Fraser index is significant at the five 
percent level throughout, with a positive coefficient, while the Heritage index is not. 
Overall, the data thus support hypotheses 2 and 4, but not 1 and 3 concerning 
empowerment rights. 
Our next step is to test for the robustness of our main results. We therefore 
replicate the EBA reported above including our measures of globalization and economic 
freedom. However, to reduce clutter, we do not report the results in tables. With respect 
to physical integrity, we focus on column 18 in Table 2 and include all additional 
variables in all possible combinations, as above. According to the results, the KOF Index 
of Globalization and the Fraser index are clearly robust determinants of physical integrity 
rights, with the CDF(0) being greater than 0.95 for both variables. Regarding 
empowerment rights, we focus on column 17 (of Table 3) given that the overall KOF 
index was not significant at conventional levels in column 18 in the first place. Our 
results show that neither globalization nor economic freedom are robust determinants of   27
empowerment rights.
35 Therefore, as outlined above, the incentives to respect human 
rights due to globalization and economic freedom are too weak to affect empowerment 
rights. The lack of consensus over what is the appropriate level of empowerment rights 
might lead the “global community” at the social and political level into believing that 
complaining about a lack of empowerment rights in other countries, when compared to 
their own rights at home, represents an inadequate outside interference in national issues: 
While physical integrity rights involve violations of basic human rights which are 
considered as inacceptable, empowerment rights involve markedly less strong human 
rights violations, and thus might be more acceptable to international observers. 
Finally, we address the question whether causality indeed runs from globalization 
and economic freedom to human rights practice. Arguably, greater human rights might 
also lead to more liberalization. Table 4 runs Granger causality tests to address the issue. 
Causality, as defined by Granger (1969), implies that a variable x is Granger-causing a 
variable y if past values of x help to explain y, once the past influence of y has been 
accounted for.  
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where i=1,..., N and t=1,..., T. The parameters are denoted j and ßj, the maximal 
lag length is m, while  it   represents the disturbance. According to our data, a lag length 
of two is appropriate. Moreover, we use a fixed effects panel estimator with clustered 
standard errors when the dependent variable is globalization or economic freedom, and 
the ordered probit estimator with clustered standard errors for human rights. To test 
whether x Granger-causes y in equation (3), we run an F-test on the ßj. We report the 
corresponding p-values in Table 4. Note that the null hypothesis of this test is that x does 
not Granger-cause y. The table reads as follows: The first entry of a p-value of 0.00 
indicates that economic globalization Granger-causes physical integrity. The next entry in 
the same row (0.45) signals that physical integrity does not Granger-cause economic 
globalization (as we fail to reject H0). Regarding physical integrity, we see that Granger 
causality only runs from globalization and economic freedom to human rights. 
                                                 
35 Note that the CDF(0) for both variables is even below 0.90.   28
The picture is less distinct when it comes to empowerment rights. Despite the fact 
that, again, all globalization measures Granger-cause empowerment, there are also 
instances where the reverse is true. However, remember that we only found significant 
results for social globalization and the Fraser index in Table 3. Those two measures are 
not Granger-caused by empowerment rights. 
To get a feeling for the magnitude of the estimated effects, we calculate the 
marginal effects at the mean of all significant variables and report them in Table 5. Note, 
however, that in the ordered probit model the marginal effects are not straightforward to 
interpret. We therefore calculate the estimated probabilities before and after a shock of 
one standard deviation on all of our physical integrity rights variables of interest. This is 
reported in Figure 1. According to the figure, the social component of globalization and 
the KOF Index of Globalization seem to have the largest impact on physical integrity. 
The estimated probability of observing the values of 3 and 4 are (at the means of all 
variables) 6.1% and 19.1%, respectively, while values 6 and 7 occur with a predicted 
probability of 26.6% and 14.9%. After an increase in the KOF Index of Globalization by 
one standard deviation, these predictions get substantially lower for low values, namely 
3.1% and 13.5% for values 3 and 4, while they increase for the high values 6 and 7 to 
30.8% and 21.0%, respectively. We conclude that these effects are not only statistically 
significant, but also quantitatively important. 
How does this compare to the other covariates for physical integrity rights? A 
shock of one standard deviation in the (log) population size increases the probability of 
observing a human rights value of 4 by 5.0%, while it decreases the probability of 
observing the value of 7 by 5.6%. An increase in democracy by one standard deviation 
decreases (increases) the probability of observing an index value of 4 (7) by 4.4% (4.9%). 
Relative to Scandinavian legal origin, other countries have a probability of observing an 
index value of 4 which is between 12% to 17% higher, while the chance of observing a 
value of 7 is lower by 12% to 22%. Finally, a civil and/or international war increases the 
likelihood of lower human rights by 6.7% and decreases the probability of high human 
rights by 6.9%. As compared to the other variables that can be directly influenced by 
policy, population size and level of democracy, the influence of internal and external 
economic liberalization is at least as large, if not larger.   29
8. Conclusion 
This paper extends the model of Poe and Tate (1994) to include economic freedom and 
three dimensions of globalization. We use the KOF Index of Globalization and two 
indices of economic freedom to empirically analyze whether globalization and 
liberalization affect human rights practice in a panel of 106 countries over the 1981-2004 
period. We extend the literature in three important ways: (i) we provide the first 
comprehensive analysis of the effects of economic globalization on human rights practice 
that includes all dimensions of economic globalization; (ii) we additionally investigate 
the specific effects of social and political globalization; and (iii) at the same time, we 
analyze the effects of economic freedom on human rights. Investigating all these issues 
with the same data allows a comprehensive insight into the link between liberal policies 
and respect for human rights. While the main control variables have been derived based 
on theoretical considerations from the previous literature, we also provide extensive 
robustness tests using more than 50 additional variables in an Extreme Bounds Analysis.  
Our results show that physical integrity rights significantly increase with 
economic freedom as well as political, social, and economic globalization (when we 
include these variables separately). When we include them together, we find that only 
economic freedom and political globalization remain significant. However, we do not 
know whether this is due to multicollinearity or rather the actual irrelevance of the 
insignificant dimensions.
36 In any case, the overall KOF Index of Globalization turns out 
to be a highly robust determinant of physical integrity rights, as is economic freedom. 
These results are important extensions to the model of Poe and Tate (1994). 
Consider the case of Croatia. Physical integrity increased from 2 in 1995 to 7 in 1996. 
While the levels of democracy, population, and GDP per capita remained more or less 
constant, the KOF Index of Globalization increased by 7 points (i.e., 15 percent) and the 
economic freedom index by roughly 10 percent. One year later physical integrity reached 
its maximum value of 8 as both globalization and economic freedom continued to grow. 
Similar examples are Morocco 1990-1991, South Africa 1994-1995, and Kenya 1992-
1993, among many others. As the increase in physical integrity rights cannot be 
                                                 
36 Our result regarding economic globalization is in line with Hafner-Burton (2005). Hafner-Burton uses a 
more traditional measure of globalization—trade—and does not find a significant effect of economic 
globalization on human rights.   30
explained by the model of Poe and Tate alone, adding our variables of main interest adds 
explanatory power.  
Interestingly, we do not find similarly robust effects of economic freedom and 
globalization on empowerment rights. While we find that empowerment rights rise with 
social globalization and economic freedom, these results are not robust to the choice of 
control variables, as indicated by the Extreme Bounds Analysis.  
Overall, we conclude that the hypothesized incentives to respect human rights 
provided by globalization mainly work for narrow basic human rights (“physical integrity 
rights”), but not for the broader “empowerment rights.” This may be the case because (i) 
there is a lack of international consensus about what precisely comprises these 
empowerment rights and (ii) given that these are “weaker” human rights, violations are 
more readily accepted by international observers. The combination of lack of consensus 
and lower importance may therefore cause empowerment rights violations to be 
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Table 1: Results EBA – Baseline Variables, Ordered Probit 
a) Physical Integrity Rights 
Variable  Avg. Beta Avg.Std.E. %Sign. CDF-U lwr Bound upr Bound
Lagged dependent 0.574 0.039 99.96 0.9999 -1.076 1.672
Population (log) -0.158 0.039 98.47 0.9960 -1.530 3.131
GDP p.c. (log) 0.239 0.082 86.16 0.9635 -20.094 5.060
Democracy 0.033 0.011 96.30 0.9845 -0.520 2.057
War -0.404 0.160 88.90 0.9635 -4.542 3.725
Legal origin British -1.262 0.239 88.30 0.9536 -15.034 2.120
Legal origin French -1.272 0.242 91.15 0.9779 -13.544 2.442
Legal origin Socialist -1.014 0.255 90.41 0.9821 -11.622 4.635
Legal origin German -1.126 0.241 85.79 0.9932 -13.136 2.271  
b) Empowerment Rights  
Variable Avg.  Beta Avg.Std.E. %Sign. CDF-U lwr  Bound upr Bound
Lagged dependent 0.576 0.044 100.00 1.0000 -0.159 34.699
Population (log) -0.040 0.041 41.79 0.7693 -2.179 9.091
GDP p.c. (log) 0.089 0.080 38.94 0.7499 -32.623 4.357
Democracy 0.091 0.015 99.58 0.9992 -0.802 12.221
War -0.173 0.158 32.71 0.8541 -18.522 15.776
Legal origin British -0.830 0.322 77.52 0.9185 -20.390 20.149
Legal origin French -0.610 0.318 57.79 0.9016 -76.877 6.732
Legal origin Socialist -0.930 0.363 67.70 0.9410 -88.412 10.638
Legal origin German -0.610 0.363 21.14 0.8803 -64.582 10.068
 
 
Note: Results based on 22,146 (physical integrity) and 22,085 (empowerment) regressions, respectively, 
including time-specific fixed effects. ‘Avg. Beta’ and ‘Avg.Std.E.’ report the unweighted average 
coefficient and standard error, respectively. ‘%Sign.’ refers to the percentage of regressions in which the 
respective variable is significant at least at the 5% level. ‘CDF-U’ is the unweighted CDF as detailed in the 
text. The threshold to consider a variable robust is 0.95. ‘lwr Bound’ and ‘upr Bound’ give the lowest and 
highest value of point estimate minus/plus two standard deviations. 
 Table 2 – Results Physical Integrity Rights, Ordered Probit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Lagged dependent 0.565 0.561 0.560 0.552 0.535 0.551 0.539 0.545 0.541 0.537 0.535 0.530 0.525 0.498 0.522 0.506 0.520 0.513
(23.46)*** (24.03)*** (23.46)*** (23.93)*** (13.22)*** (29.49)*** (12.74)*** (29.70)*** (29.46)*** (21.31)*** (22.49)*** (20.75)*** (21.66)*** (11.80)*** (29.09)*** (11.49)*** (26.52)*** (28.13)***
Population (log) -0.107 -0.091 -0.176 -0.125 -0.150 -0.133 -0.165 -0.165 -0.130 -0.131 -0.117 -0.202 -0.148 -0.181 -0.156 -0.189 -0.196 -0.152
(4.59)*** (3.77)*** (6.91)*** (5.81)*** (5.00)*** (7.69)*** (5.18)*** (6.14)*** (7.55)*** (5.49)*** (4.66)*** (7.81)*** (6.85)*** (5.57)*** (9.02)*** (5.33)*** (7.20)*** (8.93)***
GDP p.c. (log) 0.033 -0.039 0.100 -0.035 0.053 0.065 0.125 -0.081 -0.063 -2.441 -2.183 -2.257 -2.303 -2.774 -2.218 -2.757 -2.360 -2.308
(0.76) (0.73) (2.99)*** (0.69) (1.04) (2.09)** (2.08)** (1.82)* (1.64) (5.50)*** (5.74)*** (6.10)*** (6.20)*** (5.19)*** (6.49)*** (4.58)*** (6.81)*** (6.72)***
GDP p.c. (log) squared 0.150 0.130 0.142 0.137 0.170 0.138 0.171 0.140 0.136
(5.46)*** (5.59)*** (6.23)*** (6.11)*** (5.28)*** (6.76)*** (4.75)*** (6.69)*** (6.66)***
Democracy 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.031 0.025 0.030 0.023 0.022 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.042 0.033 0.041 0.029 0.030
(4.46)*** (4.28)*** (4.51)*** (3.96)*** (4.18)*** (6.23)*** (4.01)*** (5.17)*** (5.39)*** (4.65)*** (4.81)*** (4.96)*** (4.61)*** (4.40)*** (7.65)*** (4.21)*** (6.47)*** (6.95)***
War -0.330 -0.362 -0.349 -0.340 -0.504 -0.300 -0.354 -0.329 -0.310 -0.389 -0.425 -0.418 -0.407 -0.595 -0.369 -0.499 -0.380 -0.378
(3.45)*** (3.86)*** (3.83)*** (3.68)*** (2.82)*** (2.98)*** (2.39)** (3.41)*** (3.21)*** (4.04)*** (4.46)*** (4.60)*** (4.34)*** (3.24)*** (3.58)*** (3.52)*** (3.85)*** (3.78)***
Legal origin British -1.367 -1.363 -1.214 -1.269 -1.231 -1.422 -1.425 -1.267 -1.333 -1.160 -1.194 -1.021 -1.092 -0.990 -1.243 -1.229 -1.064 -1.159
(7.11)*** (6.63)*** (6.33)*** (6.27)*** (6.41)*** (5.09)*** (4.59)*** (3.23)*** (3.22)*** (6.04)*** (6.00)*** (5.50)*** (5.57)*** (4.32)*** (4.12)*** (4.06)*** (3.18)*** (4.12)***
Legal origin French -1.377 -1.373 -1.318 -1.301 -1.202 -1.446 -1.391 -1.285 -1.335 -1.091 -1.130 -1.041 -1.041 -0.870 -1.185 -1.080 -1.017 -1.078
(7.09)*** (6.53)*** (6.78)*** (6.27)*** (5.96)*** (5.15)*** (4.50)*** (3.29)*** (3.23)*** (5.67)*** (5.51)*** (5.52)*** (5.16)*** (3.76)*** (3.92)*** (3.59)*** (3.05)*** (3.82)***
Legal origin Socialist -1.213 -1.254 -1.124 -1.132 -1.115 -1.108 -1.218 -0.943 -1.036 -0.809 -0.893 -0.720 -0.754 -0.616 -0.730 -0.709 -0.554 -0.663
(5.99)*** (5.84)*** (5.23)*** (5.28)*** (4.93)*** (3.79)*** (3.85)*** (2.34)** (2.49)** (3.82)*** (4.11)*** (3.24)*** (3.46)*** (2.27)** (2.30)** (2.17)** (1.59) (2.23)**
Legal origin German -1.016 -1.078 -0.985 -0.949 -1.095 -1.177 -1.186 -0.996 -1.022 -0.955 -1.018 -0.910 -0.886 -1.020 -1.112 -1.172 -0.927 -0.958
(3.98)*** (3.80)*** (3.91)*** (3.42)*** (3.98)*** (3.99)*** (3.45)*** (2.46)** (2.37)** (4.26)*** (3.95)*** (3.97)*** (3.37)*** (3.71)*** (3.55)*** (3.69)*** (2.69)*** (3.14)***
Economic globalization 0.010 3.2E-04 0.009 0.001
(3.37)*** (0.11) (3.36)*** (0.28)
Social globalization 0.015 0.008 0.013 0.005
(3.69)*** (2.25)** (3.29)*** (1.31)
Politicial globalization 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
(3.22)*** (3.63)*** (3.34)*** (3.72)***
KOF globalization 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.015
(4.21)*** (5.22)*** (4.36)*** (4.91)***
Fraser 0.153 0.153 0.161 0.125
(2.50)** (2.39)** (4.40)*** (3.84)***
Fraser (interpolated) 0.167 0.158 0.125 0.165
(4.87)*** (4.43)*** (3.66)*** (5.27)***
Heritage 0.009 0.012
(1.49) (1.88)*
Observations 2095 2136 2157 2157 611 2090 797 2027 2090 2095 2136 2157 2157 611 2090 797 2027 2090
Countries 106 108 109 109 107 107 108 104 107 106 108 109 109 107 107 108 104 107
R-sq 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.31
Turning point in $ 3418 4430 2828 4470 3494 3091 3170 4576 4843  
 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for each year. The standard errors are clustered at the country level, except in columns 7, 8, 9, 15, 17, 18 where they 
were bootstrapped using 1000 replications. Turning point refers to the minimum of per capita GDP. The R-squared reported is a pseudo R-squared. */**/*** 
indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level.  39
Table 3 – Results Empowerment Rights, Ordered Probit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Lagged dependent 0.552 0.541 0.549 0.545 0.580 0.543 0.763 0.534 0.539 0.541 0.535 0.541 0.539 0.569 0.533 0.745 0.530 0.533
(14.76)*** (15.25)*** (15.21)*** (14.89)*** (10.30)*** (18.93)*** (12.72)*** (19.08)*** (19.47)*** (15.44)*** (15.73)*** (15.57)*** (15.48)*** (10.38)*** (19.17)*** (12.50)*** (18.64)*** (18.21)***
Population (log) 0.017 0.061 -0.018 0.020 0.023 0.017 0.010 0.034 0.022 -0.013 0.025 -0.019 -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 0.016 -0.005
(0.50) (1.73)* (0.47) (0.59) (0.52) (0.71) (0.24) (0.98) (0.89) (0.37) (0.65) (0.50) (0.20) (0.08) (0.30) (0.16) (0.45) (0.21)
GDP p.c. (log) 0.074 -0.112 0.081 -0.058 0.100 0.037 0.202 -0.093 -0.069 -2.537 -2.175 -2.485 -2.327 -2.700 -2.431 -2.896 -2.170 -2.359
(1.00) (1.26) (1.60) (0.64) (1.26) (0.91) (2.36)** (1.27) (1.04) (3.69)*** (3.02)*** (3.65)*** (3.19)*** (3.34)*** (4.94)*** (3.19)*** (4.15)*** (4.65)***
GDP p.c. (log) squared 0.155 0.125 0.152 0.138 0.163 0.145 0.180 0.126 0.139
(3.72)*** (2.80)*** (3.72)*** (3.04)*** (3.39)*** (5.03)*** (3.37)*** (3.99)*** (4.53)***
Democracy 0.077 0.079 0.076 0.079 0.066 0.081 0.091 0.082 0.083 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.078 0.090 0.105 0.089 0.090
(6.26)*** (6.92)*** (6.30)*** (6.60)*** (3.25)*** (7.60)*** (3.45)*** (7.87)*** (7.99)*** (6.89)*** (7.16)*** (6.83)*** (6.97)*** (3.69)*** (8.77)*** (3.52)*** (8.15)*** (8.71)***
War -0.166 -0.183 -0.165 -0.156 -0.137 -0.088 -0.068 -0.117 -0.088 -0.157 -0.168 -0.157 -0.152 -0.079 -0.079 -0.044 -0.105 -0.079
(1.53) (1.58) (1.51) (1.42) (0.63) (0.83) (0.38) (1.03) (0.82) (1.40) (1.44) (1.41) (1.35) (0.35) (0.72) (0.22) (0.97) (0.71)
Legal origin British 0.056 0.057 0.222 0.087 -0.077 0.065 -0.212 0.171 0.070 0.338 0.276 0.364 0.316 0.163 0.300 0.065 0.326 0.293
(0.12) (0.14) (0.50) (0.21) (0.18) (0.30) (0.60) (0.71) (0.32) (0.68) (0.60) (0.75) (0.67) (0.36) (1.32) (0.18) (1.35) (1.32)
Legal origin French 0.426 0.498 0.559 0.474 0.090 0.465 0.295 0.611 0.477 0.898 0.851 0.915 0.867 0.525 0.884 0.823 0.921 0.872
(0.90) (1.11) (1.19) (1.06) (0.19) (1.90)* (0.75) (2.39)** (1.96)** (1.67)* (1.67)* (1.72)* (1.66)* (0.98) (3.43)*** (1.75)* (3.36)*** (3.38)***
Legal origin Socialist -0.071 -0.064 0.053 -0.020 -0.038 0.118 -0.561 0.162 0.105 0.437 0.344 0.451 0.406 0.419 0.568 -0.019 0.529 0.548
(0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.04) (0.08) (0.45) (1.36) (0.59) (0.41) (0.84) (0.69) (0.87) (0.80) (0.79) (2.04)** (0.04) (1.86)* (1.98)**
Legal origin German 0.320 0.337 0.435 0.385 -0.132 0.281 -0.280 0.353 0.334 0.524 0.499 0.543 0.536 0.041 0.473 -0.088 0.465 0.480
(0.69) (0.73) (0.96) (0.85) (0.29) (1.07) (0.57) (1.26) (1.23) (1.03) (0.97) (1.08) (1.05) (0.08) (1.68)* (0.17) (1.58) (1.76)*
Protestant share 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.014 0.021 0.015 0.014
(3.47)*** (3.77)*** (3.86)*** (3.65)*** (1.88)* (5.52)*** (5.16)*** (5.96)*** (5.37)*** (3.90)*** (3.95)*** (3.97)*** (3.91)*** (2.05)** (6.06)*** (4.88)*** (6.16)*** (5.73)***
Economic globalization 0.003 -0.006 0.001 -0.006
(0.76) (1.61) (0.14) (1.60)
Social globalization 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.010
(2.87)*** (3.18)*** (1.73)* (2.11)**
Politicial globalization 0.005 0.002 0.001 -1.5E-04
(1.47) (0.89) (0.30) (0.05)
KOF globalization 0.014 0.010 0.007 0.002
(2.17)** (2.12)** (0.99) (0.46)
Fraser 0.211 0.189
(2.63)*** (2.35)**
Fraser (interpolated) 0.156 0.140 0.126 0.145 0.143 0.139
(3.66)*** (2.90)*** (2.78)*** (3.46)*** (3.02)*** (3.01)***
Heritage 0.010 0.009
(1.09) (1.06)
Observations 1412 1412 1412 1412 405 1374 535 1374 1374 1412 1412 1412 1412 405 1374 535 1374 1374
Countries 71 71 71 71 70 70 71 70 70 71 71 71 71 70 70 71 70 70
R-sq 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.40 0.34 0.34
Turingpoints in $ 3583 6003 3549 4588 3953 4371 3116 5492 4845  
 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for each year. The standard errors are clustered at the country level, except in columns 7, 8, 9, 15, 17, 18 where they 
were bootstrapped using 1000 replications. Turning point refers to the minimum of per capita GDP. The R-squared reported is a pseudo R-squared. */**/*** 
indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level.Table 4 – Granger Causality Tests 
 
[...] Granger-causes [...] is Granger-caused by [...] Granger-causes [...] is Granger-caused by
Economic globalization 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.05
Social globalization 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.16
Politicial globalization 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00
KOF globalization 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00
Fraser 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.85
Heritage 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.12
Physical Integrity Rights Empowerment Rights
 
Notes: The table reports p-values for Granger causality tests using two lags. The H0 is that variable A does 
not Granger-cause B. Therefore, the first two entries indicate that economic globalization Granger-causes 




Table 5 – Marginal Effects 
 
I n d e x  v a l u e 0123456789 1 0 E [ y
Physical Integrity
Sample Frequency 0.043 0.051 0.074 0.091 0.132 0.137 0.140 0.168 0.164 5.014
Probability at mean 2.7E-04 0.003 0.018 0.061 0.191 0.293 0.266 0.149 0.020 5.246
Economic globalization -9.2E-06 -7.7E-05 -3.7E-04 -0.001 -0.002 -5.6E-04 0.001 0.002 4.4E-04 0.011
p-value 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07
Social globalization -1.2E-05 -1.0E-04 -4.9E-04 -0.001 -0.002 -8.3E-04 0.002 0.003 6.4E-04 0.016
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Political globalization -8.5E-06 -6.7E-05 -3.1E-04 -0.001 -0.001 -4.6E-04 0.001 0.002 3.9E-04 0.010
p-value 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KOF globalization -1.9E-05 -1.5E-04 -6.9E-04 -0.002 -0.003 -1.1E-03 0.003 0.004 8.5E-04 0.022
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fraser -8.7E-05 -0.001 -0.008 -0.014 -0.029 -0.006 0.022 0.031 0.006 0.190
p-value 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Fraser (interpolated) -1.9E-04 -0.001 -0.006 -0.016 -0.030 -0.011 0.023 0.034 0.008 0.204
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Heritage -8.1E-06 -8.5E-05 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 3.1E-04 0.015
p-value 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.06
Empowerment
Sample Frequency 0.005 0.007 0.017 0.036 0.042 0.063 0.062 0.105 0.159 0.216 0.288 7.831
Probability at mean 1.6E-09 1.2E-07 5.8E-06 2.2E-04 0.002 0.019 0.056 0.174 0.334 0.319 0.095 8.158
Social globalization -1.1E-10 -7.0E-09 -2.9E-07 -9.1E-06 -7.5E-05 -4.8E-04 -0.001 -0.002 -7.8E-04 2.4E-03 1.9E-03 0.012
p-value 0.54 0.47 0.42 0.25 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08
Fraser -2.2E-08 -2.6E-06 -6.3E-05 -0.001 -0.006 -0.018 -0.034 -0.016 0.044 0.031 0.196
p-value 0.58 0.47 0.33 0.21 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
Fraser (interpolated) -1.8E-09 -6.8E-08 -3.6E-06 -1.1E-04 -0.001 -0.006 -0.013 -0.025 -0.011 0.032 0.025 0.156




Notes: The table reports the marginal effects corresponding to Tables 2 and 3 by index values. The row 
‘sample frequency’ reports the observed frequency in the sample, while ‘probability at mean’ yields the 
































Probability at mean 2.7E-04 0.003 0.018 0.061 0.191 0.293 0.266 0.149 0.020
Economic globalization 9.9E-05 0.001 0.011 0.044 0.160 0.283 0.290 0.184 0.028
Social globalization 1.5E-05 0.001 0.007 0.034 0.138 0.276 0.305 0.206 0.034
Political globalization 4.1E-05 0.001 0.009 0.039 0.151 0.281 0.296 0.192 0.030
KOF globalization 0.000 3.5E-04 0.006 0.031 0.135 0.275 0.308 0.210 0.034
Fraser 1.7E-04 0.001 0.008 0.044 0.157 0.287 0.291 0.184 0.027
Fraser (interpolated) 5.2E-05 0.001 0.010 0.041 0.156 0.280 0.293 0.189 0.030
Heritage 1.7E-04 0.002 0.011 0.046 0.162 0.288 0.286 0.181 0.024
012345678
 
Notes: The figure visualizes the effects of a one standard deviation change of the variables of interest in Table 2 (columns 9-16). Appendix A: Sources and Definitions 
Variable Description Source
Physical integrity The composite index of physical integrity rights is the additive of 
torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonments, and 
disappearance, ranging from 0-8.
Cingranelli and 
Richards (2006)
Empowerment index The composite index of empowerment rights is the additive of 
freedom of movements, freedom of speech, workers’ rights, political 
participation, and freedom of religion indicators, ranging from 0-10.
Cingranelli and 
Richards (2006)
Democracy Measures the general openness of political institutions on the scale -
10-10 (-10 = low; 10 = high). 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2000)
Population (log) Natural logarithm of a country's population. World Bank (2009)
GDP p.c. (log) Natural logarithm of GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 
international $)
World Bank (2009)
Legal origin Dummies for British, French, Socialist, and German legal origin. Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2001)
War Dummy variable indicating a civil and/or an international war with at 
least 1,000 casualities.
Gleditsch et al. (2002)
Economic globalization Economic sub-index of the KOF index of globalization Dreher (2006a)
Social globalization Social sub-inde of the KOF index of globalization Dreher (2006a)
Politicial globalization Political sub-index of the KOF index of globalization Dreher (2006a)
KOF globalization KOF index of globalization Dreher (2006a)
Fraser Economic Freedom by the Fraser Institute Gwartney and Lawson 
(2008)
Heritage Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation Miller and Holmes 
(2009)
Additional Variables used in the EBA
Age of democracy Defined as: AGE = (2000 - DEM_AGE)/200 and varying between 0 
and 1, with US being the oldest democracy (value of 1).
Persson and Tabellini 
(2003)
Age of parties Average age of political parties. Beck et al. (2001)
Area (log) Natural logarithm of land area (square kilometer). World Bank (2009)
British colony Former British colony. CEPII (2010)
Catholic Share Share of catholics in population. Persson and Tabellini 
(2003)
Constituency Indicates whether the constituencies of the senators are 
states/provinces.
Beck et al. (2001)
Debt service Public and publicly guaranteed debt service (percent of GNI). World Bank (2009)
Diversified exporters Dummy for diversified exporters. Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2001)
Dominant religion Percent of dominant religion. Alesina et al. (2003)
Election year, legislative Dummy for legislative elections. Beck et al. (2001)
Ethnic fractionalization Index of ethnic fractionalization. Alesina et al. (2003)
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (percent of GDP). World Bank (2009)
Federalism Dummy for federal states. Norris (2009)
Fractionalization Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, approximating the level of lack of 
ethnic and linguistic cohesion within a country, ranging from 0 
(homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fractionalized).
Persson and Tabellini 
(2003)
Gap in schooling Difference between years of schooling male and years of schooling 
female.
Barro and Lee (2000)
Government debt Central government debt, total (percent of GDP). World Bank (2009)
Government Fractionalization The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
government parties will be of different parties.
Beck et al. (2001)
Government transfers Transfers to sub-national from other levels of Government (% of total 
sub-national revenues and grants).
IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics 
Growth GDP growth (annual, percent). World Bank (2009)  43
 
Variable Description Source
Human Development Indicator Composite index based on measures of life expectancy, literacy, 
education, and standards of living.
United Nations (2005)
Iberian colony Former Spanish or Portuguese colony. CEPII (2010)
IMF program Dummy for an IMF program which is at least five months in effect in 
a given year.
Dreher (2006b)
Infant mortality Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births). World Bank (2009)
Investment Gross capital formation (percent of GDP). World Bank (2009)
Investment growth Gross capital formation (annual percent growth). World Bank (2009)
Language fractionalization Index of language fractionalization. Alesina et al. (2003)
Left government Indicates whether the main government party is left-wing. Beck et al. (2001)
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, total (years). World Bank (2009)
Military dictator Dummy indicating whether the head of government is a current or 
past member of the armed forces.
Cheibub et al. (2010)
New state Dummy for new states. Gallup et al. (2001)
Number of human rights 
organizations
Number of human rights related NGOs being represented in a 
country.
Union of International 
Associations (2000)
Population growth Population growth (annual %) World Bank (2009)
Post election, executive Share of the year within after 12 months of an executive election. Dreher and Vaubel 
(2009)
Post election, legislature Share of the year within after 12 months of a legislative election. Dreher and Vaubel 
(2009)
Pre-election, executive Share of the year within 12 months of an executive election. Dreher and Vaubel 
(2009)
Pre-election, legislature Share of the year within 12 months of a legislative election. Dreher and Vaubel 
(2009)
Primary schooling Average years of primary schooling in the total population. Barro and Lee (2000)
Protestant share Share of protestants in population. Persson and Tabellini 
(2003)
Religious fractionalization Index of religious fractionalization. Alesina et al. (2003)
Revenue decentralization Sub-national Revenues (% of total revenues) IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics 
Special interests Dummy for special interest executive parties. Beck et al. (2001)




Tiers Number of government tiers. Treisman (2000)
Tiers, average Average area first tier units (thousands square kilometers per unit). Treisman (2000)
Trade Exports and Imports (in percent of GDP). World Bank (2009)
Urban population Urban population (percent of total). World Bank (2009)
Urban population growth Urban population growth (annual %) World Bank (2009)
Vertical imbalance Intergovernmental transfers as a share of sub-national expenditures. IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics 




Years in office Indicates the number of years the government chief executive has 
been in office.
Beck et al. (2001)
Years left Number of years the government chief executive remains in office. Beck et al. (2001)
Years of independence Ranging from 0 to 250 (the latter value is used for all non-colonized 
countries).
Persson and Tabellini 
(2003)  44
Appendix B1: EBA Results – Physical Integrity Rights 
Variable  Avg. Beta Avg.Std.E. %Sign. CDF-U lwr Bound upr Bound
Age of democracy 0.8365 0.3672 81.20 0.9275 -13.954 53.211
FDI 0.0187 0.0114 59.56 0.9113 -0.627 1.328
Years in office 0.0109 0.0074 44.22 0.9071 -0.295 3.094
Years of independence 0.0015 0.0009 68.83 0.9052 -0.067 0.049
Tiers 0.1439 0.0829 56.53 0.9030 -2.528 5.274
Iberian colony -0.2640 0.1558 61.76 0.9003 -12.400 15.535
Number of human rights organizations 0.0053 0.0029 70.79 0.8894 -0.145 0.434
Tiers, average 0.0006 0.0004 45.83 0.8851 -0.021 0.107
IMF program -0.1489 0.1026 53.95 0.8751 -61.358 3.024
Protestant share 0.0077 0.0056 43.29 0.8549 -0.374 0.286
Vertical integration 0.0039 0.0041 24.27 0.8434 -0.594 0.902
Dominant religion -0.0051 0.0039 48.08 0.8379 -0.207 0.163
Government debt 0.0023 0.0024 57.41 0.8293 -0.321 0.097
Constituency -0.2508 0.2271 34.26 0.8281 -193.93 70.125
Catholic Share 0.0023 0.0024 27.83 0.8179 -0.052 0.233
Growth 0.0070 0.0104 19.80 0.7813 -0.303 0.745
Pre-election, executive -0.1484 0.1737 28.80 0.7715 -234.18 7.449
Government transfers 0.0014 0.0043 13.26 0.7697 -0.418 0.574
Infant mortality -0.0041 0.0112 31.80 0.7684 -11.408 5.055
Trade 0.0016 0.0019 11.21 0.7538 -0.056 0.136
New state -0.0612 0.0694 23.02 0.7469 -1.842 2.881
Religious fractionalization 0.1648 0.3584 38.47 0.7439 -20.036 18.996
Pre-election, legislature 0.0854 0.1125 16.48 0.7437 -4.162 3.051
Urban population -0.0042 0.0047 12.64 0.7426 -0.366 0.063
Government Fractionalization 0.1424 0.1895 9.77 0.7304 -7.008 13.444
Revenue decentralization 0.0076 0.0091 13.17 0.7217 -0.888 1.644
Investment growth 0.0015 0.0026 27.07 0.7162 -0.218 3.110
Life expectancy -0.0081 0.0210 14.19 0.7111 -5.402 3.091
Urban population growth 0.0303 0.0370 17.50 0.7094 -3.477 14.835
Primary schooling 0.0497 0.0731 8.02 0.6909 -8.402 22.709
Military dictator 0.1423 0.1906 7.40 0.6906 -3.131 19.358
Federalism 0.0511 0.1479 15.80 0.6830 -12.468 3.966
Language fractionalization 0.1493 0.2614 3.75 0.6795 -7.417 31.990
Post election, executive -0.1151 0.1754 3.76 0.6750 -8.998 66.803
Left government -0.0320 0.0876 3.75 0.6746 -1.976 5.480
Area (log) 0.0209 0.0426 9.42 0.6703 -4.803 3.405
Debt service -0.0080 0.0145 21.66 0.6548 -0.941 0.880
Sub-national Tax Revenue -0.0010 0.0041 2.54 0.6519 -0.426 0.775
Age of parties 0.0009 0.0022 6.58 0.6448 -0.092 0.069
Years left -0.0063 0.0321 0.25 0.6025 -16.889 0.683
Gap in schooling -0.0440 0.0305 17.06 0.5897 -23.311 23.292
Ethnic fractionalization -0.0582 0.2634 3.42 0.5821 -7.036 15.534
World Bank projects -0.0011 0.0398 7.17 0.5787 -3.240 0.890
Post election, legislature -0.0443 0.1236 6.25 0.5733 -5.827 13.714
Diversified exporters -0.0044 0.1205 5.17 0.5462 -5.092 5.360
British colony -0.0259 0.1559 6.38 0.5462 -10.962 60.689
Human Development Indicator 0.4688 1.2645 9.68 0.5459 -144.76 1045.7
Election year, legislative 0.0026 0.0949 0.87 0.5445 -14.210 14.288
Investment 0.0015 0.0072 16.29 0.5378 -0.639 0.691
Population growth -0.0138 0.0715 26.63 0.5351 -2.475 12.431
Special interests 0.0067 0.1697 6.61 0.5350 -6.041 8.163
Fractionalization -0.0006 0.2898 1.65 0.5033 -7.657 13.139    45
Appendix B2: EBA Results – Empowerment Rights 
Variable  Avg. Beta Avg.Std.E. %Sign. CDF-U lwr Bound upr Bound
Protestant share 0.0138 0.0053 84.42 0.9674 -0.183 0.163
Population growth -0.1008 0.0574 65.72 0.9188 -13.695 6.616
Number of human rights organizations 0.0065 0.0037 63.63 0.9138 -0.900 0.148
Dominant religion -0.0066 0.0035 66.07 0.9064 -0.346 0.115
Left government 0.1407 0.0950 72.22 0.9038 -3.338 4.089
Growth -0.0168 0.0117 39.05 0.8935 -0.730 0.210
Religious fractionalization 0.4524 0.3263 62.62 0.8737 -22.125 65.972
Government Fractionalization -0.2141 0.1838 28.06 0.8667 -7.440 6.404
Urban population growth -0.0554 0.0341 55.48 0.8627 -3.192 4.437
World Bank projects 0.0586 0.0465 48.69 0.8615 -6.354 2.339
Iberian colony -0.2574 0.1597 46.12 0.8398 -23.178 6.987
Vertical integration 0.0046 0.0045 29.21 0.8278 -0.301 2.012
Government transfers 0.0041 0.0046 27.07 0.8152 -1.758 0.526
Urban population -0.0041 0.0042 13.90 0.7997 -0.247 0.260
Tiers, average 0.0002 0.0005 9.01 0.7653 -0.801 0.044
Government debt 0.0017 0.0026 22.32 0.7576 -0.094 0.276
IMF program -0.0953 0.1073 9.94 0.7535 -6.837 7.623
British colony 0.1414 0.1740 11.41 0.7456 -5.149 10.653
FDI 0.0098 0.0164 13.20 0.7430 -0.418 3.334
Years left -0.0187 0.0316 31.74 0.7405 -1.294 1.006
Language fractionalization 0.2198 0.2485 11.92 0.7378 -4.536 10.777
Age of democracy 0.3776 0.4188 38.61 0.7373 -43.898 16.941
Catholic Share 0.0020 0.0029 9.99 0.7335 -0.112 0.320
Pre-election, executive -0.0973 0.1762 4.61 0.7238 -5.282 8.287
Trade -0.0011 0.0018 8.02 0.7209 -0.185 0.192
Investment -0.0054 0.0080 28.28 0.7110 -0.236 1.762
Post election, legislature 0.0607 0.1305 3.26 0.7060 -4.233 9.509
Revenue decentralization 0.0073 0.0108 16.55 0.7051 -3.409 4.329
Sub-national Tax Revenue -0.0022 0.0042 8.18 0.6894 -0.279 0.699
Years in office 0.0050 0.0099 14.24 0.6821 -0.374 2.757
Ethnic fractionalization -0.1489 0.2794 11.85 0.6779 -184.82 10.813
Age of parties 0.0010 0.0022 4.44 0.6751 -0.445 0.975
Diversified exporters -0.0724 0.1356 5.73 0.6701 -3.934 3.291
Human Development Indicator 0.9865 1.2689 14.12 0.6681 -48.963 247.19
Military dictator -0.0646 0.2219 5.48 0.6313 -16.558 11.389
Area (log) -0.0263 0.0430 9.57 0.6203 -1.390 5.204
Election year, legislative 0.0148 0.0948 3.70 0.6164 -2.511 6.684
Federalism 0.0242 0.1413 4.83 0.5960 -12.151 19.284
Years of independence 0.0001 0.0011 10.81 0.5883 -0.035 0.028
Tiers -0.0546 0.0913 10.45 0.5871 -6.423 1.785
Life expectancy 0.0022 0.0231 43.86 0.5837 -7.649 4.962
Post election, executive 0.0310 0.1844 1.90 0.5772 -17.027 27.486
Investment growth 0.0003 0.0034 3.05 0.5480 -0.307 0.111
Infant mortality -0.0026 0.0071 24.82 0.5462 -1.243 1.865
Constituency 0.0901 0.2303 18.81 0.5384 -56.023 34.802
Fractionalization -0.0490 0.2994 3.90 0.5377 -10.273 22.135
Special interests 0.0432 0.1500 6.20 0.5361 -8.563 9.951
New state, dummy 0.0020 0.0759 3.14 0.5176 -2.059 3.109
Gap in schooling -0.0193 0.0259 7.15 0.5149 -19.533 4.687
Debt service 0.0017 0.0176 7.88 0.5085 -0.623 2.018
Pre-election, legislature -0.0260 0.1228 3.86 0.5021 -6.475 13.166
Primary schooling -0.0077 0.0771 7.18 0.5013 -6.825 3.256  CESifo Working Paper Series 
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